What were the main themes in the book: Here is a brief summary of the key ideas in Descartes Meditations. Descartes Meditations — 1: What can be called into Doubt In the first of Descartes Meditations, he realises that he cannot verify anything unless it is doubted.
Humans have or seem to have both physical properties and mental properties. People have or seem to have the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences.
These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have or seem to have mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much elseintentionality including beliefs, desires, and much elseand they are possessed by a subject or a self.
Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties—like those of an electron—are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties.
I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical.
The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components. Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa?
Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct? Do mental states influence physical states?
Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self. The problem of consciousness: How is it related to the brain and the body?
The problem of intentionality: The problem of the self: Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. The problem of embodiment: What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?
The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.
Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so.
The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role.
Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience. Dualist views the subject of this entry say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other.
|Desmond Clarke||The Philosophy of Rene Descartes, a french rationalist Rene Descartes is the most famous french philosopher.|
For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below. In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.
In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies.
It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding.
In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends 78b4—84b8.In Neuroscience and Philosophy three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience.
The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, ), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Mind–body dualism, or mind–body duality, is a view in the philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are distinct and separable.
Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and between subject and object, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism and enactivism, in the.
In Descartes (and his time), philosophy is the science and study of all nature. In a famous definition, Descartes says, in fact, that p hilosophy is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics and then the trunk is physics. René Descartes (–) was a creative mathematician of the first order, an important scientific thinker, and an original metaphysician.
Blutner/Philosophy of Mind/Mind & Body/Cartesian dualism 3 Descartes’ attribute-mode distinction Instead of properties of substances Descartes speaks of attributes and modes.
An attribute is what makes a substance the kind of substance it is A mode can be that can be seen as specifying the attributes possible values. These. This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind.
The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles.